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HISTORY AS OUR GUIDE?: THE PAST AS AN INVISIBLE SOURCE 
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE LEGISLATIVE DEBATES ON 
THE ALIEN ACT IN THE UNITED STATES (1798) AND THE 
ÉMIGRÉS PROBLEM IN FRANCE (1791) 
JELTE OLTHOF* 
INTRODUCTION 
There exists a curious relation between history and constitutions. 
Constitutions are a written attempt to “solidify” the present, i.e., to capture the 
prevailing norms and values of one generation and make them binding on 
future generations. At the same time, a constitution that is stuck in the past will 
quickly become outdated and redundant. As a result, constitutions constantly 
seek a balance between continuity and change. This makes it problematic to 
settle what exactly vague norms, such as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of “cruel and unusual punishment,” mean. When applying the original text to 
new and unanticipated problems, the question of what the constitution exactly 
says becomes particularly pressing. Those interpreting the constitution, 
whether they are judges, politicians, or scholars, are always faced with 
bridging the distance between past and present.1 Even though most 
constitutions contain a correction mechanism in the form of amendments, this 
procedure is typically so cumbersome as to make the outcome uncertain and 
time-consuming. As a result, advocates of a certain reading of the constitution 
often try to bolster their argument by invoking the “spirit” of the constitution; 
the unspoken and invisible principles on which the document is based.2 
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 1. Rik Peters, Constitutional Interpretation: A View from a Distance, 50 HIST. & THEORY 
(THEME ISSUE) 117, 117 (Dec. 2011). 
 2. For a discussion of the “spirit” of the United States Constitution, see Robert A. Goldwin 
& Robert A. Licht, Preface to THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: FIVE CONVERSATIONS ix, ix–x 
(Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990). 
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The idea that there is a letter as well as a spirit of the constitution stems 
from the different functions it performs. Constitutions not only establish a 
framework of government (the branches) and the relations between them 
(separation of powers and check and balances). They also provide a raison 
d’être, a reason why the inhabitants of a certain territory should form one 
political community.3 The Italian political philosopher Dario Castiglione, in 
this sense, distinguishes between the instrumental and symbolic function of the 
constitution.4 Whereas the instrumental constitution states the rules of 
governing for a political community, the symbolic constitution holds that these 
rules reflect the fundamental principles and values of that particular 
community.5 On the symbolic level, in other words, the constitution is seen as 
the expression of that political community’s identity. This symbolic 
constitution corresponds to the invisible constitution that is the theme of this 
Symposium. As the American legal scholar Laurence Tribe has pointed out, 
the invisible constitution plays an important role in establishing the meaning of 
the visible constitution.6 According to Tribe, all extra-textual sources used to 
determine the meaning of the visible constitution can be considered part of its 
invisible counterpart.7 History, as a source of constitutionality, certainly fits 
this description. 
The reason why history is often cited to settle the meaning of constitutional 
disputes lies in the belief that the true nature of things can only be known by 
the study of their past. This relationship between history, identity, and 
constitutions is highly complex and requires some clarification. According to 
the German philosopher of history Herman Lübbe, identity should be defined 
as the answer to the question of who we are.8 This answer often takes the form 
of a story—or history—that explains the narrative dimension of identity, which 
can be seen as the story people tell about themselves in order to give continuity 
to their existence as members of a political community.9 Countless scholars 
have stressed the constructivist nature of identity, i.e., that when our 
 
 3. Peter A.J. van den Berg in this sense speaks of the “integrative function” of 
constitutions. See Peter A.J. van den Berg, The Integrative Function of Constitutions: A 
Historical Perspective, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 13–14 
(Fabian Amtenbrink & Peter A.J. van den Berg eds., 2010). 
 4. Dario Castiglione, The Political Theory of the Constitution, 44 POL. STUD. 417, 421–22 
(1996). The latter is sometimes also called the “constitutive” function of constitutions to 
distinguish it from the instrumental function as laying down the framework for government. 
 5. Id. 
 6. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 7 (2008). 
 7. Id. at 6. 
 8. HERMANN LÜBBE, GESCHICHTSBEGRIFF UND GESCHICHTSINTERESSE: ANALYTIK UND 
PRAGMATIK DER HISTORIE 147 (1977). 
 9. See ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF 
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP 45 (2003). 
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understanding of ourselves changes, so does our identity.10 The identity of a 
certain group, in this sense, is never “given,” but can be constituted by means 
of narrative rhetoric.11 The crucial point here is that all constitutions are an 
expression of a political community’s identity and that this identity is shaped 
by stories about the past. The past, then, functions as the first tier in a three-
stage argument known as a narrative which connects past to present and future. 
These narratives form powerful tools to shape the audience’s idea of who they 
are by defining who they were. 
Just how narratives constitute identity can best be illustrated by studying 
constitutional interpretation in practice. In this Article, a case will be made for 
the past as an important invisible source of constitutionality by analyzing two 
eighteenth-century controversies on both sides of the Atlantic: the debate on 
the Alien Act in the United States Congress in 1798 and the debate on the 
émigrés problem in the French Legislative Assembly in 1791. A comparison 
between France and the United States is interesting because the two “sister 
republics” faced the same challenge by the end of the eighteenth century.12 
Both countries were in the process of creating a new, working constitutional 
order in the wake of revolutionary upheaval.13 The unrest in the countries and 
unsettled nature of the constitutions forced French and American legislators 
constantly to adapt past principles to pressing problems.14 Moreover, the 
violent fate of the French Revolution, which entered the bloody Reign of 
Terror after 1792, makes a comparison even more interesting.15 Besides 
illustrating how views of the past play a crucial role in constitutional 
interpretation, the comparison can also shed light on whether different attitudes 
towards the use of the past in constitutional interpretation can be distinguished, 
and whether these differences can help explain the radically different fate of 
the two revolutions. 
To answer these questions, this Article studies two constitutional conflicts 
in the French and American legislatures. The French debate on the émigrés and 
the American debate on aliens naturally concerned very different issues. The 
Alien Act, for example, targeted aliens coming to and staying in the United 
 
 10. GERARD DELANTY & CHRIS RUMFORD, RETHINKING EUROPE: SOCIAL THEORY AND 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF EUROPEANIZATION 51 (2005); SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD, supra 
note 9, at 32. 
 11. Maurice Charland, Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois, 73 Q.J. 
SPEECH 133, 133–34 (1987). 
 12. See, e.g., SUSAN DUNN, SISTER REVOLUTIONS: FRENCH LIGHTNING, AMERICAN LIGHT, 
1–26 (1999) (describing the “sister revolutions” in the United States and France). 
 13. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 38–39 (1963). For the familiarity between the 
French and American revolutionaries, see generally DUNN, supra note 12. 
 14. DUNN, supra note 12, at 11. 
 15. ANNIE JOURDAN, LA RÉVOLUTION, UNE EXCEPTION FRANCAISE? 298–99 (2004). 
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States,16 whereas the French were debating émigrés who were seeking to leave 
or who already resided outside its borders.17 Yet, on a more abstract level, the 
two debates share a similarity that make a comparative analysis worthwhile. 
Both the American immigrants and French émigrés triggered a search for the 
meaning of conflicting clauses in the constitutions. This way, both debates 
invited the speakers to turn to the past for guidance and can shed light on the 
role history played in post-revolutionary constitutional interpretation. 
I.  THE DEBATE ON THE ALIEN ACT IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS IN 1798 
In the year 1798, the United States celebrated its twenty-second birthday as 
an independent federation and entered its second decade under the new 
Constitution. America’s first officer, President George Washington, had 
steered the country away from potentially explosive conflicts with Europe,18 as 
well as through domestic rebellion, and left her at peace with her neighbors, if 
not herself. As the eighteenth century was drawing to an end, however, so was 
the relative ease with which the fledgling republic had been governed. 
Washington’s presidency had already seen political infighting,19 certainly, but 
as long as the esteemed General remained at the helm, harmony had remained 
the priority in national politics. In fact, the realization that the country would 
only “hang together” with him at its head was the only reason for the tired 
Washington to seek a second term as the country’s First Officer.20 By 1796, 
however, the aged General decided that despite increasing tension among the 
members of his administration, the time had come for him to retire.21 
Washington’s retirement heralded in a period of fractional politics that had 
been long in the making. In almost Freudian fashion, no sooner had the father 
stepped down than his sons started the fight over who should replace him. The 
two factions in Congress—which started calling themselves Federalists and 
Republicans22—had been at each other’s throats long before Washington left 
office,23 but after 1796 an open conflict between them seemed unavoidable. 
Right in the middle of this fight were two old friends, Thomas Jefferson and 
John Adams, who suddenly and unwillingly found themselves leading actors in 
a political drama. The stern Massachusetts lawyer John Adams considered 
 
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 222 (2004). 
 19. Id. at 215–16. 
 20. Id. at 220. 
 21. Id. at 232. 
 22. It is important to note that the Federalists and Republicans (or Democratic-Republicans, 
as they were officially called) did not constitute political parties in the modern sense of the word, 
but rather state-centered organizations that formed a loose coalition on the national level. See 
STANLEY M. ELKINS & ERIC L. MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 515 (1993). 
 23. See ELLIS, supra note 18, at 214–17. 
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himself the heir apparent of the Federalist faction.24 Adams had proven himself 
a loyal, hard-working Vice President, but after eight years in what he 
considered “the most insignificant Office that ever the Invention of Man 
contrived,” he was eager to put his talents to better use in the country’s highest 
office.25 That the flamboyant Virginian Thomas Jefferson would become his 
challenger was all but certain. Jefferson had retired from politics when he left 
as Secretary of State in 1793 and retreated to his rural retreat Monticello, 
surrounded by his books and his slaves.26 At the same moment Washington 
decided it was time for retirement, however, Jefferson decided it was time to 
end his and, encouraged by his Republican friends, decided to make a bid for 
the presidency.27 
As was customary at the time, none of the candidates made any public 
effort to gain support, instead leaving their campaigns to be run by others.28 
The outcome of the election, which put Adams in the White House by a margin 
of only three votes, only made things worse between the two factions.29 
Although Jefferson resigned himself quietly to the Vice Presidency—which 
was then, as now, often a very quiet job—the same could not be said for his 
supporters.30 Across the country, the Republicans were forming ever more 
clubs and organizations where their creed of egalitarianism and limited 
government was preached.31 The press too, with the notorious Aurora at its 
center, started to barrage the new administration,32 which was matched only by 
the accusations of treason in newspapers in league with the Federalists.33 
Finally, Congress itself increasingly became the site where the rivalling 
Federalist and Republican members fought out their differences, and this fight 
was not confined to words alone.34 In the first months of 1798, a shouting 
match between Republican Representative Matthew Lyon of Vermont and his 
Federalist colleague Roger Griswold of Connecticut got out of hand.35 During 
one debate Lyon had covered his opponent with tobacco spit, a month later the 
 
 24. SUSAN DUNN, JEFFERSON’S SECOND REVOLUTION: THE ELECTION CRISIS OF 1800 AND 
THE TRIUMPH OF REPUBLICANISM 74, 253–54 (2004). 
 25. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Dec. 19, 1793), available at www.masshist. 
org/digitaladams/aea/cfm/doc.cfm?id=L17931219ja. 
 26. DUNN, supra note 24, at 76. 
 27. Id. at 78–79. 
 28. Id. at 81. 
 29. Id. at 85. 
 30. Id. at 86–87. 
 31. See DUNN, supra note 24, at 141. 
 32. Id. at 103. 
 33. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION 
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 46 (2004). 
 34. See ROBERT V. REMINI, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 62 (2006). 
 35. Id. 
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two rolled over the House floor in a fist-slinging frenzy, cheered on by their 
colleagues.36 
In this increasingly hostile climate, John Adams eagerly sought for ways to 
consolidate his victory. It was clear that Adams was more “vulnerable to 
criticism” than his predecessor, since he lacked both “Washington’s popularity 
and stature.”37 Conscious of the limited mandate his margin of three electoral 
votes gave him, Adams set the wheels in motion to guarantee his reelection in 
the new century. Part of this comprehensive plan to undermine his opponents’ 
reelection prospects was the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.38 Although the 
Sedition Act is by far the most notorious and has attained the position of cause 
célèbre among the advocates of free speech,39 its smaller brother the Alien Act 
is by no means less worthy of this indignation. 
The Alien and Sedition Acts were a barely disguised attempt of the Adams 
administration to undermine its opponent’s base of support by throwing up 
barriers against immigrants.40 It was a widely recognized fact that newcomers 
to the United States, especially the numerous French and Irish immigrants, felt 
more at home with the egalitarian platform of Jefferson’s Republicans than the 
well-to-do elitism of Adams’s Federalists.41 If the partisan nature of both the 
Alien and Sedition Acts was not clear from whom they targeted, the fact that 
pieces of the legislation would be in force until March 3, 1801—which 
“coincidentally” marked the end of Adams’s first term—was a dead 
giveaway.42 Eager though they were to secure their hold on the federal 
government, the Federalists made sure the Acts could not be turned against 
them should they lose the Presidency in the next election.43 
The Alien Act was composed of three bills aimed at making life worse for 
aliens in America. The first bill was a supplementary act to the existing 
naturalization act that required all white aliens in the United States to be 
registered and extended the residency requirements for citizenship from five to 
fourteen years.44 There was no doubt that the Constitution, in Article I, Section 
8, granted Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization,”45 and even the staunchest opponents of the Acts conceded 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–
1815, at 257 (2009). 
 38. STONE, supra note 33, at 43, 46, 67. 
 39. Id. at 188–91. 
 40. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 21 (1956). 
 41. Id. at 23. 
 42. STONE, supra note 33, at 67. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802). 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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this.46 The second bill, the “Alien Enemies Act,” stated that in case war had 
been declared, all male subjects of the hostile nation could be “apprehended, 
restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies” on the President’s order.47 
Apart from vesting too much power in the hands of the President, this bill too 
was considered by the opposition to fall within Congress’s constitutional 
powers.48 
It was the third bill that comprised the Alien Act that drew considerable 
fire from the opposition and gave rise to a month-long debate in the Fifth 
Congress.49 This bill, called “An Act concerning Aliens,” gave far-reaching 
powers to the President to deal with suspicious aliens.50 Under this bill, it 
would become lawful for the President “to order all such aliens as he shall 
judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have 
reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret 
machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of 
the United States.”51 In other words, the bill made all aliens residing in the 
United States subject to deportation, regardless of whether they were subjects 
of a hostile nation.52 Furthermore, under the bill, the burden of proof was 
shifted to the alien: as soon as the President had “reasonable grounds to 
suspect,” the alien could be expelled “without wrongdoing, and without 
trial.”53 In short, the Alien Act declared all aliens outlaws who could be 
deported from the United States or locked up for three years without warning 
and without cause. 
The Republican opposition in Congress was outraged by the Alien Act and 
immediately devised a battle plan to kill the bill in the House of 
Representatives.54 Unlike the Senate, where the Federalists held an absolute 
majority and the debate was not recorded by the press,55 the Federalists 
commanded a majority of only six seats in the House–fifty-six seats against the 
 
 46. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1571 (1798). 
 47. Alien Enemies Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–
24 (2006)). 
 48. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1793–95 (1798). Even Albert Gallatin, one of the leading 
opponents of the Alien Enemies Act, recognized that the right to arrest alien enemies was “a 
power possessed by every nation, which it had a right to exercise for its own security.” Id. 
 49. SMITH, supra note 40, at 47. 
 50. Alien Friends Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800). 
 51. Id. § 1, at 571. 
 52. Id.; see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1580 (1798) (advocating limitation on President’s 
power to situations where “war was first declared by this country”). 
 53. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–
1801, at 255–56 (1997). 
 54. Douglas Bradburn, A Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 566–68, 595 (2008). 
 55. SMITH, supra note 40, at 48. 
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Republicans’ fifty.56 If the opposition, in other words, could convince even a 
handful of Federalists of the undesirability of the Alien Acts, Adams’s anti-
alien train could still be derailed. One factor that worked in the opposition’s 
favor was the public nature of House debates, which were recorded by 
reporters and published in major newspapers.57 This way, the Republican 
orators could reach the wider audience of the literate electorate and mobilize 
them against the bill. Even if the Alien Acts were passed, Republicans could 
still hope to move the voters to return a strong Republican House in the 
midterm elections of 1798, which would in turn be able to repeal the Alien 
Acts.58 The Republicans understood that to end the Federalist dream of 
expelling aliens, a strong display of rhetoric in the House of Representatives 
was necessary. 
The sizeable Republican faction in the House boasted several eloquent 
speakers that were up to the task. Most outspoken was the Pennsylvania 
Representative Albert Gallatin.59 The Swiss-born Gallatin identified strongly 
with the European immigrants whose wellbeing the Acts put at risk.60 Like 
them, he had braved the Atlantic in the 1780s in pursuit of a better life.61 The 
Acts offended Gallatin personally in a second way, since he had been ousted 
from the Senate four years earlier by the Federalists on account of supposedly 
not meeting the required nine years of citizenship.62 To many, the Alien Acts 
looked like a ploy of the Adams administration to prevent newcomers like 
Gallatin to serve their new country.63 Gallatin found a capable political ally in 
the eloquent New York lawyer Edward Livingston.64 Though he was late to 
arrive in the debate, Livingston’s passionate attack of the Act immediately set 
him apart from the rest of the faction.65 
Together, Gallatin and Livingston worked tirelessly to stop the Alien Act. 
In their speeches on the House floor, the two orators tried to frame the Act as a 
 
 56. HENRY ADAMS, THE LIFE OF ALBERT GALLATIN, 219–20 (Peter Smith 1943) (1879). 
 57. SMITH, supra note 40, at 333, 420–21. 
 58. Alan Taylor, The Alien and Sedition Acts, in THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE BUILDING 
OF DEMOCRACY 63, 63 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2004). 
 59. See ADAMS, supra note 56, at 203 (describing one example of Gallatin’s outspoken 
leadership). 
 60. See Taylor, supra note 58, at 69 (“The Federalists derided Gallatin, a Swiss immigrant of 
modest means, for his foreign origins, French accent, and frontier residence.”). 
 61. RAYMOND WALTERS, JR., ALBERT GALLATIN: JEFFERSONIAN FINANCIER AND 
DIPLOMAT 10 (1957). 
 62. JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS, ALBERT GALLATIN 63 (1959). 
 63. NICHOLAS DUNGAN, GALLATIN: AMERICA’S SWISS FOUNDING FATHER 63 (2010). 
 64. See Taylor, supra note 58, at 69 (“Livingston could rely on wealth, connections, and the 
social graces garnered by birth into a leading family of landlords, by his education at Princeton, 
and by his success as a lawyer in New York City.”). 
 65. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2005–15 (1798); Taylor, supra note 58, at 69–70. 
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deliberately vague, unnecessary, and unconstitutional usurpation of power.66 
With this bill, Gallatin told his colleagues “a new crime [is] instituted, which 
[is] that of being a suspected person.”67 Since the suspects were not officially 
charged—in itself a clear violation of their habeas corpus rights—it was 
impossible to determine what they stood accused of, let alone to prove their 
innocence.68 Even more worrisome, Livingston added, was the fact that one 
could unknowingly act suspiciously since “a careless word, perhaps 
misrepresented, or never spoken, may be sufficient evidence; a look may 
destroy, an idle gesture may inspire punishment.”69 Under the Alien Act, 
Livingston insisted, justice would become a mockery, for how could the aliens 
remove the suspicion, if they were never told whereupon it was founded?70 The 
Federalists, in other words, were asking the House to trust that the President 
would seize only the culpable aliens—something that Gallatin and Livingston 
clearly were not prepared to do. 
Apart from violating the aliens’ right to a fair trial, the Republicans also 
insisted that Congress lacked the constitutional power to pass the Alien Act.71 
The Federal Government, Gallatin pointed out, was one of enumerated powers, 
none of which allowed Congress to give the President the power to deport 
aliens.72 Following the Tenth Amendment, which states that powers not 
granted rest with the States or the people,73 the competence to remove aliens 
clearly rested with the states, not the federal government.74 By placing this 
power in the hands of the President, Livingston argued, the Federalists were 
transforming the federal government into an “engine of oppression” and 
discarding the idea that the United States was created as a federal 
government.75 In short, the Republicans framed the Alien Act as a vague and 
oppressive measure calculated to vest despotic powers in the hands of the 
President. As such, Livingston argued, the Act was not only not allowed under 
the enumerated powers granted by the Constitution, but violated the 
fundamental principles the Constitution sought to protect.76 
The defense of the Alien Act was headed by the sizable Federalist 
delegation from Massachusetts. The main sponsor of the bill, the Boston 
lawyer Samuel Sewall, could not have chosen a more fitting cause to 
 
 66. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1789–90, 1793, 1955 (1798). 
 67. Id. at 1789. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 2008. 
 70. Id. at 2011. 
 71. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1798). 
 72. See id. 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 74. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1955–56 (1798). 
 75. Id. at 2010. 
 76. See id. at 2010–11. 
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champion. Sewall’s great-grandfather Samuel had been a judge at the Salem 
witch trials, in which twenty suspected “witches” had been put to death on the 
basis of questionable testimonies.77 Samuel Sr. had later apologized for this 
blunder,78 but his great-grandson showed no sign of leniency against the 
suspected aliens.79 Samuel Jr. answered the criticism that the Republicans 
leveled against the Alien Act. The Alien Act, he told the House, was not a 
usurpation of power, but a necessary and constitutional measure to provide for 
the public safety of the United States.80 “In the event of a war with France,” he 
pointed out, “all her citizens here will become alien enemies.”81 In such a 
scenario, Sewall emphasized, the President should have at his disposal 
“whatever measures are necessary” to dispose of the threat these aliens posed 
to the United States.82 
Sewall’s framing of the Alien Act as a public safety issue provided a sense 
of urgency and justification and was quickly adopted by other Federalists. 
Harrison Gray Otis, the unofficial leader of the Massachusetts delegation, 
added to the sense of urgency by proclaiming that America found itself “in a 
time of war.”83 A Harvard graduate and prominent descendant from an 
immensely wealthy and influential family, Otis considered the Alien Act the 
perfect mechanism to protect the United States against the immigrant rabble.84 
“[T]he times are full of danger,” he told the House, “and it would be the height 
of madness not to take every precaution in our power.”85 Otis called to mind 
the fate of Gallatin’s native Switzerland, which had succumbed to the French 
revolutionary army after seditious infiltrates had opened the gates for them.86 
“[I]n the fate of the European Republics,” he argued, “we might read our own, 
unless all the prudence and energies of our country were summoned to avert 
it.”87 It was futile to think, Otis continued, that America was not infiltrated by 
the enemy.88 No further evidence was required, he concluded, than the 
Republican opposition against the bill, which was proof enough that they too 
had fallen prey to “the contagion of the French mania.”89 
 
 77. EVE LAPLANTE, SALEM WITCH JUDGE: THE LIFE AND REPENTANCE OF SAMUEL 
SEWALL 1–2 (2007). 
 78. Id. at 1. 
 79. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1974 (1798). 
 80. Id. at 1959. 
 81. Id. at 1790. 
 82. Id. at 1959. 
 83. Id. at 1791. 
 84. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1989 (1798). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 1961. 
 87. Id. at 1962. 
 88. See id. at 1961–62. 
 89. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1798). 
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For the Federalists, in short, the Alien Act was a matter of public safety. In 
their view this constituted a higher law than the personal liberty of potentially 
seditious aliens and the constitutional balance of power. The question was not, 
as one Federalist speaker put it, of danger arising from the government having 
too much power, but from its want of power. And the Federalist orators had no 
doubt that the Constitution provided the necessary power. Both Sewall and 
Otis pointed out that the power to protect the United States against threats, 
foreign and domestic, was implied in the preamble,90 which stated that the 
Constitution had been established to “provide for the common defence.”91 That 
this power belonged to Congress alone was “extremely clear” according to 
Otis, since it was also listed in the enumerated powers in Article I.92 But even 
without this explicit reference, many Federalists believed the constitutionality 
of the Alien Act to be common sense.93 According to Connecticut lawyer 
Samuel Dana, the one power inherent to every government was “the power of 
preserving itself,” as without it, the Constitution would carry its own 
destruction in itself.94 It was crystal clear to Dana that this power belonged to 
the United States alone, since “[w]hat relates to the Union generally, must be 
done by the Government of the United States.”95 Dana’s colleague from South 
Carolina, Robert Harper, added that “if the safety of the Government of the 
Union is to depend upon the discordant wills of sixteen States, deplorable and 
debased indeed would be its situation.”96 
The debate between the Federalist proponents and Republican opponents 
of the Alien Act demonstrates how deep the difference of opinion between the 
two factions really was. Whereas the Federalists considered the deportation of 
suspect aliens a just and necessary exercise of power, the Republicans regarded 
it as an unnecessary usurpation. The most heated exchange between the two 
factions, however, concerned the unconstitutionality of the bill. Gallatin first 
raised this point by claiming that the bill violated both habeas corpus rights and 
the Tenth Amendment, which prescribed that the power to deal with aliens 
rested with the state governments.97 The Federalists, however, pointed to the 
duty to “provide for the common defence,” which they claimed squarely 
placed the power with the Federal Government.98 
It is important to point out, at this point, the nature of constitutional 
debates in the House. In this pre-Marbury era, the constitutionality of laws was 
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considered to be settled in Congress by means of a simple majority vote.99 If a 
law was passed by Congress, in other words, it was presumed to be in 
accordance with the Constitution, since the members of Congress supposedly 
understood the limits to their power well enough not to overstep them.100 Many 
representatives were aware, of course, that where these limits to Congressional 
power lay rested entirely on how strictly one interpreted the Constitution. In 
the hands of politicians, John Kittera observed that “[t]he Constitution . . . [is] 
like polemics in the hands of divines: it was made to prove everything or 
nothing.”101 This did not mean that the delegates believed the constitutional 
issue was a trivial one. On the contrary, many members of the House assumed 
there was only one correct interpretation of the Constitution.102 What it does 
demonstrate is the rhetorical nature of the debate, since the most persuasive 
interpretation stood the best chance of winning. The point, then, was to show 
your side had the only right interpretation of the Constitution, whereas the 
other’s was plainly false. Otis understood this when he claimed that the Alien 
Act “followed the Constitution as a lamp to his path,” whereas Gallatin’s 
portrayal of it made “it a mere ignis fatuus [will o’ the wisp], calculated to 
bewilder and mislead.”103 
As a result of this emphasis on how the delegates viewed the Constitution, 
the debate on the Alien Act did not focus simply on one disputed constitutional 
clause, but turned into a discussion of the “spirit” of the document, i.e., the 
underlying idea or rationale behind the Constitution. Viewed from this angle, 
the debate was one between two views on the proper role of government that 
the Constitution established: that of protecting liberty and that of guaranteeing 
safety. 
The Republicans naturally invoked the former view of the Constitution. 
Gallatin observed during one of the first days of the debate that the Alien Act 
violated the “spirit of our Constitution,” which he understood to forbid any 
exercise of power not explicitly warranted by that document.104 In his view, the 
Constitution became a contract, stating which competences belonged to the 
Union and guaranteeing that all others rested with the States.105 Gallatin’s view 
was shared by many in the Republican faction. According to North Carolina 
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Representative Robert Williams, “Our Constitution would be a very slender 
security to the people of this country . . . if, on the cry of there being danger 
here, or seditious persons there, violations were to be made in it, in order to 
meet the evil.”106 In fact, he continued, if the Federalists were right in their 
interpretation of the preamble, the rest of the Constitution became redundant, 
as “[t]his preamble of the Constitution would swallow up the whole.”107 
The Federalists, on the other hand, relied on the view of the Constitution as 
a document protecting the country. In framing the Alien Act as a measure of 
public safety, Sewall already relied on this view. His colleague Otis pointed 
out that the preamble stated that the Constitution was ordained to provide for 
the common defense of the Union and thus imposed “the sacred and superior 
duty of providing for the safety of the country.”108 “If we find men in this 
country,” Otis argued, “endeavoring to spread sedition and discord[,] . . . 
whose hands are reeking with blood, and whose hearts rankle with hatred 
towards us—have we not the power to shake off these firebrands? Certainly we 
have.”109 Would, he asked his colleagues, a Constitution that allowed such 
atrocities to go on unopposed be “worth a farthing?” According to Otis, “It 
certainly would not.”110 What the sponsors of the bill wanted, Otis explained, 
was not to overthrow the Constitution, but to “preserve it against the attempts 
of insidious and dangerous aliens.”111 The Federalists, in short, relied on a 
view of the Constitution as a shield, or “coat of mail” as one orator put it, to 
protect the United States against seditious outsiders.112 
To summarize, the debate on the Alien Act turned from a dispute over the 
necessity and constitutionality of an anti-immigrant measure into a full-blown 
conflict over the true vision of the Constitution and, with that, the legacy of the 
Revolution. At this point, references to the past were relied on by both sides to 
support their claim to possess the only “true” interpretation of the Constitution. 
To support their reading of the Constitution, the Republican orators fell 
back on the principles of 1776. According to Gallatin, the experience under 
British rule had taught the framers the value of limited government. The Alien 
Act was a clear sign that the Federalists were acting in violation of this legacy. 
It was, Gallatin said, “calculated to eradicate from our minds the principles of 
the Revolution, and to concentrate power in the Executive.”113 Instead of 
honoring their identity as the freest nation in the world, the Federalists were 
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assuming the role of oppressors themselves. The Federalists, Gallatin said, 
“instead of being bound by a Constitution . . . claim the omnipotence of a 
British Parliament.”114 This way, the idea that the Constitution was a document 
establishing the limits to the powers of government, was “completely 
annihilated.”115 By asking the House to pass the Alien Act, in other words, the 
Federalists were turning Congress itself into a part of their “engine of 
oppression” and, as Livingston pointed out, “[i]f we exceed our powers, we 
become tyrants.”116 
The reference to the revolutionary past was more than a ploy to cast the 
Federalists as oppressors; it demonstrated, in the eyes of the Republicans at 
least, that the Alien Act was un-American. Livingston warned the House that 
the adoption of the Alien Act would herald in despotism.117 According to him, 
it constituted the “sacrifice of the first-born offspring of freedom . . . by those 
who gave it birth,” and it would be absurd, he insisted, “to call ourselves ‘free 
and enlightened,’ while we advocate principles that would have disgraced the 
age of Gothic barbarity.”118 This made the Act, as one Republican member of 
the House put it, “fitter for the code of Algiers than of America.”119 
The above quotes illustrate how the Republicans employed powerful 
narrative reasoning to move their audience to vote against the measure. By 
portraying the bill as fit for foreign despots, the Republicans depicted the Alien 
Act as alien to the United States. America’s true identity, they maintained, was 
that of a free and enlightened country, born in a struggle against a tyrannical 
colonial oppressor and built on the principles of liberty and limited 
government. In this light, the Alien Act became a measure intended to destroy 
the true spirit of the Constitution, and with it the soul of America. Tellingly, 
Livingston feared that the adoption of the Alien Act would mean the end to the 
“sacredness” of the Constitution and that the country, as a result, would be 
“swallowed up in the gulf of despotism.”120 The narrative further cast the 
Federalists as the successors of the ancient foe that the revolutionary 
generation had fought so hard to get rid of and turned opposition against the 
Alien Act into an almost holy goal. Gallatin at one point insisted that resistance 
to unconstitutional laws was the sacred duty of every American.121 This 
reduced the choice for each representative to one for or against America. In 
order to uphold the true legacy of the Revolution as establishing a free country, 
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the members of Congress had to vote down the Alien and Sedition Act, as this 
alone would prevent a Great-Britain-style takeover of American politics. 
Two, however, could play at this game, and the Federalists relied on a 
narrative of their own to support their reading of the Constitution. Their view 
was, simply stated, that the Framers could never have intended to establish a 
regime that carried its own destruction within itself. As Harrison Otis pointed 
out, the main concern of the members of the Philadelphia Convention had been 
to remedy the paralyzing respect for the sovereignty of the States that had 
become fatal to the Confederation.122 The Constitution they had created sought 
to prevent this from happening again. As such, Otis refused to consider the 
debate as a choice between violating the Constitution or protecting the country. 
“If this was the dilemma into which we are reduced by the Federal compact,” 
he insisted, “it might as well have never been made, for a Government that is 
prevented from exercising an authority which may be necessary to its 
existence, is not better than no Government at all.”123 It would mean, Otis 
concluded, that “the present Constitution would have no advantage over the 
old Confederation.”124 
In this narrative, the Alien Act was far from a violation of the fundamental 
principles of the Constitution, and became an honest attempt to prevent history 
from repeating itself. From this angle, it was the Republican faction that 
squandered the true legacy of the Revolution and tried to destroy America. 
South Carolina representative Robert Harper proclaimed that he would 
consider himself “the worst of traitors and assassins to his country” if, by his 
opposition to the Alien Act, he would “bind us hand and foot, until our enemy 
comes upon us.”125 Far from an un-American measure, in other words, the 
Alien Act was a patriotic attempt to protect America against its subversive 
enemies. In the Federalists’ view, the Republicans were the ones out of touch 
with American identity; they were the true traitors to their country. The true 
legacy of the Revolution, they said, was that of 1787, and by voting for the 
Alien and Sedition Act, congressmen were only making operational the 
promise of providing for the common defense already ordained by the 
Constitution.126 
The debate on the Alien Act in the United States House of Representatives 
clearly demonstrates how the past works as an invisible source of 
constitutionality. Faced with a controversy in which both sides, Republicans 
and Federalists, could quote credible clauses of the visible Constitution in 
support, the representatives instead invoked the “spirit” of the document to 
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prove they were right. Unsurprisingly, Federalists and Republicans turned out 
to have different views of the “true” spirit of the Constitution, and the debate 
consequently turned to the question of whose view was most convincing. To 
answer this question, the members of the House reached outside the visible 
Constitution, and instead relied on narratives to lend credibility to their views. 
The Republican orators Gallatin and Livingston called to mind the principles 
of 1776 to portray the Constitution as a sacred contract that the Federalists 
violated by means of the tyrannical Alien Act. In this view, the true legacy of 
the Revolution was a jealous vigilance of the limits of government, and the 
only true American was he who opposed the Alien Act. The Federalist orators 
Otis and Harper, on the contrary, portrayed their opponents’ position as a 
return to the redundant and fatal principles of the Confederation. They insisted 
that the framers in Philadelphia had intended the Constitution to be a shield to 
protect government, not to shackle it. In this view, the true legacy of the 
Revolution was order and the only true American was he who stood up to 
defend his country by granting the President the necessary means to deal with 
seditious aliens. 
What can the debate on the Alien Act tell us about the past as a source of 
constitutionality? First, it is clear that the past does not function as a guide that 
was slavishly followed. The speakers’ views of the Constitution and the 
constitutionality of the Alien Act did not depend on historical inquiry but was 
guided itself by the position taken prior to the debate. Nevertheless, the past 
clearly functions as a source for claims about the invisible Constitution to 
support a certain reading of the visible Constitution. The past, or rather, a 
certain portrayal of the past, functions as the first, crucial step in the three stage 
narrative argument that confers a historical identity on the present in order to 
motivate a certain action in the future. 
A further point that must be noted is the interesting fact that in the 
American debate, both sides rely on the past for their view of the Constitution. 
History, in other words, is made to serve two masters: it is invoked to establish 
the constitutionality as well as the unconstitutionality of the Alien Act. The 
fact that Republicans and Federalists emphasize a different phase of the past—
the Revolutions of 1776 and 1787 respectively—is a significant fact, but it 
should not cloud the fact that the past as such is an undisputed source of 
constitutional reasoning in the United States. The question then becomes, to 
what extent is this a unique feature of American constitutional culture? This 
brings us to the second case study, the debate on the émigrés problem in the 
French Assembly of 1791. 
II.  THE ÉMIGRÉS PROBLEM IN THE FRENCH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN 1791 
If the Federalists in 1798 were troubled by the thought of a revolution à la 
française breaking out in America, in 1791, the French revolutionaries 
themselves were extremely concerned with the course their revolution was 
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taking. The year 1791 was a crucial period in the French Revolution. By the 
summer of 1791 the Revolution was entering the third year of political 
upheaval, which would test the new regime’s ability to restore order to France. 
The Assemblée Constituante (Constituent Assembly), whose declaration as 
France’s national parliament in June of 1789 provided the spark of the 
Revolution,127 had, after more than two years, fulfilled its promise of giving 
the nation its first written constitution. The Constitution of 1791 transformed 
the formerly absolute King Louis XVI into the “King of the French,” and 
reduced him to a constitutional monarch who functioned as head of state and 
leader of the cabinet.128 A ratification ceremony in September 1791 completed 
the metamorphosis when King Louis publicly swore his fidelity to the nation 
and promised to uphold the new Constitution as the law of the land.129 
With the adoption of the Constitution, the members of the Constituent 
Assembly had fulfilled their duty and gave way to their successors, France’s 
very first nationally elected legislative body, the Assemblée Législative 
(Legislative Assembly). As a result of a last-minute decree of the radical 
deputy Maximilien Robespierre, the members of the Constituent Assembly 
were barred from reelection, leaving the inexperienced newcomers of the 
Legislative Assembly to put their Constitution into practice.130 Thus, when the 
745 members of the Legislative Assembly took their seats in early October, the 
nation literally had a fresh start. The delegates of the Legislative Assembly that 
came trickling into Paris by the end of the summer were almost all complete 
strangers to each other. Large portions of the deputies were obscure, provincial 
citizens with middle-class backgrounds as doctors, officers, and lawyers. Most 
of their careers had been in local revolutionary government or as members of 
the local political clubs and regiments of the National Guard.131 These were the 
men (women were still considered unfit to serve in public office) charged with 
the duty of implementing the Constitution that had been ratified only three 
weeks earlier. The daunting nature of this task became clear when, only three 
weeks after they assumed their seats, the delegates found themselves bogged 
down in a conflict over the émigrés issue. 
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The émigrés had been a product of the Revolution and part of it from the 
start. In July 1789, days after the fall of the Bastille, one of the King’s brothers, 
the comte d’Artois, left France, disgusted with what he considered as an insult 
to the French crown.132 By June 1791, the King’s other brother and numerous 
courtiers had joined him in the German border town of Koblenz.133 A small 
army of dissatisfied nobles and officers were flocking to the royal banner, 
determined to reestablish the absolute monarchy in their home country.134 
These émigrés, as the aristocratic emigrants were soon labeled, would cause a 
parliamentary confrontation between the two factions in the Assembly, the 
Feuillants and Girondins. Like the debate on the Alien Act in America, the 
émigrés debate demonstrates the role that the past played in early French 
constitutional interpretation. 
The more conservative right wing of the Assembly was dominated by the 
Feuillant faction, so called for their membership in the Club des Feuillants.135 
The Feuillants did not form a political party in the modern sense of the word, 
but rather, a loose collection of like-minded delegates who worked together. 
Although this faction consisted entirely of new faces, the Feuillants were in 
fact the successors of the moderate deputies who oversaw the drafting of the 
Constitution in the Constituent Assembly.136 The Feuillant Club was still 
dominated by this old guard, including one of its founders, the Grenoble 
lawyer Antoine Barnave. According to Barnave, the first order of business was 
strengthening the monarchy, which formed the only hope for restoring order to 
France.137 King Louis XVI and his wife Marie-Antoinette formed a beacon of 
stability behind which all Frenchmen could rally. Barnave’s greatest fear was 
that the inexperienced deputies of the Legislative Assembly would become 
“l’instrument de quelque hommes qui . . . préparaient la chute de la 
Constitution.”138 The best way to avoid this destruction was to ensure that both 
King and Assembly strictly observed the limits provided by the Constitution. 
Although Roberspierre’s decree denied Barnave a seat in the Assembly, he 
found capable lieutenants among the 170 new delegates that joined his club. 
Most prominent among them were the eloquent major Mathieu comte de 
Dumas, and the outspoken colonel François marquis de Jaucourt. 
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The men Barnave had in mind when warning about the downfall of the 
Constitution were the members of the Girondin faction who dominated the 
progressive wing of the Assembly. Like the Feuillants, the Girondins were not 
a traditional political party, but rather a loose group of like-minded deputies 
who met in salons to discuss politics and potential strategies to realize their 
plans.139 Unlike the Feuillants, the Girondins did not derive their name from a 
club—though many were prominent members of the Jacobin Club—but from 
the department, la Gironde, which many of them represented.140 The views of 
these men can be described as liberal, but like true liberals they left each other 
free to formulate their opinions. While it is difficult to formulate a common 
platform, the Girondins did share common sources of inspiration that shed 
light on their convictions. First and foremost, the Girondins were inspired by 
the American Revolution. Jacques Brissot, their unofficial leader, had traveled 
through America and returned impressed with the freedom its citizens enjoyed. 
According to him, the federal state was also the ideal form of government for 
France.141 Like their American counterparts, the Girondins saw their 
Revolution as a fight against monarchical tyranny and believed that true 
freedom was irreconcilable with monarchy. Unlike the Feuillants, the 
Girondins did not consider the Constitution the termination of the Revolution, 
but a necessary first step on the road to freedom. “Une grande revolution s’est 
opérée en France,” the philosopher marquis de Condorcet argued, “elle n’est 
pas terminée.”142 In other words: the monarchy was an obstacle to a truly free 
republic. 
The Girondins had good reasons to mistrust the Court. It was a “public 
secret” that the royal couple was very unhappy with the constitutional 
straightjacket that had been imposed on them. This had led them to attempt to 
flee the country in June 1791. Despite their disguises, the King and Queen 
were recognized by a postal officer in the border town of Varennes and 
returned, under guard, to the capitol where they remained prisoners of the 
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National Guard. The flight to Varennes and the public outrage it created 
threatened to upset the entire Revolution, because it made the limited 
monarchy envisaged in the Constitution entirely worthless.143 To save their 
lives’ work, a coalition of moderates lead by Barnave intervened and portrayed 
the flight as a kidnapping. Despite loud protests from the radical delegates, 
Barnave persuaded the Constituent Assembly to adopt a proclamation stating 
that, since the royal family had been abducted against their will, there was no 
cause to depose them.144 The decision of the Constituent Assembly to save the 
monarchy seemed more inspired by a wish to curb a possible counterrevolution 
than a genuine concern for the King. By July 1791, the delegates of the 
Constituent Assembly were exhausted after two years of drafting the 
Constitution.145 They wanted to save their work from ruin and Barnave played 
on this feeling by stating that “il est temps de terminer la Révolution” and 
presenting his kidnapping theory as the best possible solution to do so.146 
In saving the monarchy, Barnave did the Revolution little good. The 
King’s flight brought the émigrés issue back to the forefront. At first, the 
revolutionaries considered the émigrés no problem at all.147 The departure of 
counter-revolutionary aristocrats was a relief in the eyes of many.148 During 
the summer of 1791, however, increasingly ominous reports arrived in Paris 
from the borderlands. Reports surfaced that the second cousin of the King, 
Jospeh de Bourbon-Condé, was amassing an army of émigrés at Worms and 
that both brothers of the King had joined him there.149 According to the 
reports, the roads to Germany were filled with aristocrats who were unhappy 
with the religious and political situation in France and had turned their back on 
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their former home country.150 The flight of the royal couple to Varennes 
sparked another exodus of émigrés and caused many noble officers to leave 
their posts. For many, the defense of the royal house was the only thing still 
keeping them in France, and now that their commander-in-chief had sought to 
leave, few officers saw any reason to stay and crossed the Rhine to join the 
émigrés army.151 No less than 6,000 officers defected by the end of 1791, 
leaving the French army bereft of nearly sixty percent of its officer corps.152 
The growing fears of an invasion by the émigrés army led to panic in the 
borderlands, where some cities even took to restoring their ramparts.153 All 
eyes turned towards the Legislative Assembly in Paris to resolve the crisis. 
The deputies in the Legislative Assembly found it increasingly hard to 
ignore the issue. By late October alarming reports and petitions from the 
borderlands, often presented by local citizens who traveled all the way to the 
capitol to impress the urgency of the situation on the delegates, made it harder 
and harder for the delegates to bury their heads into the sand.154 On October 
20, despite heavy resistance from the Feuillant faction, the Girondin leader 
Brissot succeeded in placing the émigrés problem on the agenda, where it 
remained until the law concerning émigrés was adopted in early November.155 
At stake in the émigrés debate were three issues. The first was whether the 
émigrés could be called to a halt or, in other words, whether restricting the 
freedom of movement could be constitutionally justified. The second issue was 
whether the émigrés could be punished, and the third issue was how they 
should be punished. The first question is the most important for the purposes of 
this Article, as it invited a discussion of the visible constitution and forced the 
delegates to demonstrate why their interpretation was superior. 
Determined to restore order to France, the Feuillants considered the 
émigrés as a nuisance that withheld the Assembly from addressing the real 
problems the nation faced. Their first line of defense in the debate was to point 
out that the émigrés problem was no problem at all. Jean Delacroix, a lawyer 
from Chartres, questioned the necessity of proposals limiting the freedom of 
movement. The Girondins, Delacroix argued, were motivated by “craintes 
chimériques”; he asked out loud, “[O]ù sont les faits, où est le danger?”156 In 
Delacroix’s view, the delegates should be glad to be rid of the fossils from the 
Ancient Regime and had little to fear from their scheming. There was nothing 
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to be afraid of, because the little band of pygmies, as one orator labeled the 
émigrés, could not challenge a united France inflamed by a passion for 
liberty.157 
Scholars have more than once pointed out that this estimation was correct. 
Studies demonstrate that the émigrés at Koblenz formed no threat to the 
revolutionary army, since they lacked the manpower and discipline to conduct 
an operation on French soil.158 When war finally broke out in 1792, the poor 
performance of the émigrés regiments in the contra-revolutionary army 
confirmed how little the revolutionary government had to fear from them. In 
anticipation of this, the Feuillants urged the Assembly that the best way to deal 
with the émigrés was to ignore them and focus on restoring order in France. In 
fact, as one deputy for Paris, the lawyer Emmanuel Pastoret, pointed out, 
prosperity, calm, and order formed the best “laws” against emigration, since 
they would take away its underlying cause.159 Once France showed itself an 
orderly constitutional monarchy, the aversion of the aristocrats would 
diminish. In this sense, Pastoret concluded, the best protection that the French 
had against the scheming of the émigrés was “du bonheur que la Constitution 
lui assure.”160 
For many in the Feuillant faction, however, the émigrés question was a 
pure constitutional issue that should be settled regardless of any potential threat 
to the nation. The very first speaker in the debate, the Breton judge Joseph 
Lequinio, insisted that the freedom of movement was guaranteed by the 
Constitution and that emigration could, as a consequence, not be prohibited. 
The émigrés, he argued, “n’ont fait qu’user du droit liberté générale, établi par 
la nature et consacré dans vos lois constitutionnelles.”161 In other words, they 
had “pas fait un crime, en usant du droit que vous aves le plus solennellement 
établi et . . . vous ne devez pas les punir.”162 As Lequinio told his colleagues, 
the French people were attached to their Constitution and even more so to the 
natural rights it guaranteed, and he expected the Assembly to uphold and 
protect these rights, especially in the face of danger.163 
For Lequinio, as well as many other Feuillants, the issue was a matter of 
principle. Since the Constitution explicitly guaranteed as a natural and eternal 
right to each citizen “la liberté à tout homme d'aller, de rester, de partir, sans 
 
 157. Id. at 318–19. The unidentified speaker is Raymond Gaston. 
 158. For a good summary of these studies, see Ladan Boroumand, Emigration and the Rights 
of Man: French Revolutionary Legislators Equivocate, 72 J. MODERN HIST. 67, 68 (2000). 
 159. 34 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 148, at 407. 
 160. Id. (“the well-being that the Constitution assures him.”). 
 161. Id. at 299 (“the émigrés have only exercised their right to liberty, established by nature 
and consecrated in your constitutional laws.”). 
 162. Id. (They had “not committed a crime, by exercising the right that you have most 
solemnly decreed and . . . you should not punish them”). 
 163. Id. at 299. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] HISTORY AS OUR GUIDE? 399 
pouvoir être arrêté, ni détenu, que selon les formes déterminées par la 
Constitution” the unconstitutionality of emigration restrictions was a foregone 
conclusion.164 According to François Jaucourt, who had served as captain in 
Condé’s dragoons, a violation of fundamental rights could not be allowed: 
“[une] projet d’une loi contre l’émigration . . . est contraire au droit naturel, à 
notre Constitution.”165 
The dead certainty with which the Feuillants presented their case reflected 
their deep-rooted belief in the truth and inviolability of laws of nature. 
According to Lequinio, these constituted “le droit plus solennel” and formed 
the backbone of the Constitution. They limited the powers of Government and 
created a sphere of “non-interference” and personal liberty. Since the 
Constitution, for the Feuillants, formed the goal as well as the endpoint of the 
Revolution, it is clear that a violation of a principle of the Constitution could 
not stand. The Revolution has been completed, Mathieu Dumas stated, and if 
the Assembly insisted on taking measures against the émigrés, “c’est dans [la 
Constitution] qu’il faut chercher des moyens plus qu’il faut des moyens plus 
certaines et plus féconds d’opérer le bien de la patrie.”166 Pierre Baignoux, an 
administrator from Tours, argued that respect for the Constitution and a 
prudent and careful enforcement of its principles should prevent the delegates 
from intervening in the émigrés problem. Certainly, Messieurs, he said, “avec 
une constitution comme la nôtre, nous n’avons besoin de règlements 
proscripteurs pour attacher à leur patrie les citoyens française.”167 
The position of the Feuillants can be summarized as principled and 
reluctant. The right wing of the Assembly was unanimously opposed to 
restricting the freedom of movement, since such a restriction violated a natural 
right guaranteed in the Constitution. In this light, many of the Feuillant 
delegates even considered a discussion of emigration restriction 
unconstitutional in itself. At the same time, many others were more than 
willing to discuss the merits of a restriction only to point out that the measure 
was unnecessary since the émigrés hardly formed a threat to the new nation. 
Whatever the case, the Feuillants were unanimous in their position that 
everyone had the constitutional right to emigrate, that it did not constitute a 
crime, and should go unpunished. 
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For the Girondins, on the contrary, the émigrés were a real problem that 
the Assembly could not ignore. They argued that the country could not stand 
idly by as a great number of citizens left the country with a view to plot its 
destruction. Far from exercising their natural rights, the progressive lawyer 
Jean Crestin argued, the act of emigrating abroad with a view to taking up arms 
against France was “le plus dangereux, le plus lâche des abus de la liberté.”168 
Like the Federalists’ argument that self-preservation was the first duty of every 
sovereign state, Crestin argued that a nation’s first duty was to protect itself. 
Certainly, he said, “il serait bien extraordinaire qu’une nation ne pût pas 
prendre pour sa sûreté les précautions que les lois de toutes les nations ont 
prisés pour la sûreté des individus.”169 In a similar vein, his colleague from 
Morbihan, Yves Audrein concluded that “dans les temps extraordinaires, il est 
nécessaire de prendre des mesures extraordinaires.”170 
Although the “extraordinary circumstances” played a crucial role in the 
Girondins’ defense of emigration restriction, there was a deeper constitutional 
foundation underlying their convictions. All proponents of the restriction on 
the freedom of movement agreed that the reciprocity of social contract formed 
the justification for it. Revolutionary citizenship, they maintained, did not 
simply consists of enjoying certain rights, but of having the duty to defend the 
community that guaranteed those rights. According to one outspoken deputy 
from Doubs, Jean Voisnard, each citizen had the obligation not to do what 
tended to directly diminish the freedom or prosperity of his country. He relied 
on the first section of the Constitution, which stated the following: “comme la 
liberté ne consiste qu'à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit ni aux droits d'autrui, 
ni à la sûreté publique, la loi peut établir des peines contre les actes qui, 
attaquant ou la sûreté publique ou les droits d'autrui, seraient nuisibles à la 
société.”171 
The Feuillants’ constant hammering on the fundamental right to freedom 
was, in the eyes of Voisnard, a one-sided approach to the problem: “ils [les 
émigrés] ont surtout la liberté de faire leur devoir.”172 By conspiring against 
their motherland, the émigrés forsakened their duties as citizens, committed a 
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breach of contract, and were traitors. These “ennemis de la patrie,” as the 
Girondins called them, were guilty of treason—a crime punishable with death. 
Overlooking the debate, it is clear that the French delegates, like their 
American counterparts, were unable to settle their dispute solely by quoting 
relevant, but mutually exclusive clauses of the Constitution. As in the debate 
on the Alien Act, the French revolutionaries’ disagreement on the 
constitutionality of a potential emigration restriction rested on two opposing 
views of the Constitution of 1791. In the eyes of the Feuillants, the 
Constitution was the accomplishment of the Revolution, the document that 
safeguarded the newly found rights of Frenchmen and guaranteed the 
privileges so long denied by absolutism. For the Girondins, on the other hand, 
the Constitution formed the starting point of a Revolution still in progress. 
This disagreement on the “finality” of the Constitution added an extra 
dimension to the debate. It is clear the French delegates were not in agreement 
on whether the Assembly even had the right to interpret the clauses in the 
Constitution. According to the Feuillants, the Assembly’s task was simply to 
uphold the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, i.e., to determine whether the 
émigrés enjoyed a freedom of movement and to then grant it to them. The 
Girondins, on the other hand, went a step further and claimed that the 
Legislative Assembly, as sole interpreter of the laws, actually had the duty to 
interpret what the Constitution said. Since the French Constitution did not 
explicitly grant the power of review to any of the branches of government, it 
was primarily left to the Assembly itself to decide whether an emigration 
restriction conformed to the highest law.173 As a result, the debate was about 
more than the émigrés: it concerned the very self-image of the deputies as 
passive implementers of timeless principles or the active interpreters of the 
Constitution, and with that, shapers of their own destiny. 
As in the debate on the Alien Act, the past also played a crucial role as a 
source for constitutionality in the émigrés debate. Like the Jeffersonian 
Republicans, the Feuillants invoked the past to emphasize that the Constitution 
had been ordained to limit the powers of government. They viewed the 
Revolution as a struggle against absolutism that culminated in the Constitution 
of 1791 and secured for all Frenchmen, even potential émigrés, the natural 
right to go where they wanted. The liberal major Mathieu Dumas, one of the 
champions of the Feuillant faction, was the most outspoken advocate of this 
view. Dumas, a major in the French army who had served under Rochambeau 
in the American Revolutionary War, believed that the natural rights in the 
Constitution were the great legacy of the Revolution. According to him, the 
Constitution could only be destroyed by the faults of those to whom it was 
entrusted, in other words the Assembly, and only “si ce n’est par les fausses 
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mesures auxquelles on nous entrainerait, et par l’oubli des moyens simples et 
naturels qui sont l’objet véritable de notre mission.”174 Thus, the duty of the 
Assembly was to live up to this task and to not jeopardize the achievements of 
the Revolution by raising a despotic government in its place. “Nous remplirons 
notre tâche, et nous ne nous laisserons pas plus aveugler par les pièges du 
faux patriotisme, et que par suite de l’usurpation du pouvoir que nous sommes 
destinés à contenir.”175 The true legacy of the Revolution was a jealous 
vigilance of the constitutional limits to the government’s power, and the only 
true keeper of this legacy was he who took serious the sacred duty to ensure 
that despotism never again governed France. 
As the speech by Dumas demonstrates, the Feuillant faction in the 
Assembly used a narrative very similar to the Jeffersonian Republicans and, in 
the same way, invoked the past as a struggle against tyranny to argue that 
delegates should be guardians of liberty. The Girondin faction, however, took 
an entirely different approach to the past. Their view of the Constitution as a 
“social contract” among the French citizens inspired an entirely different view 
of the relation between past and present. 
This Girondin position was most clearly articulated by their most eloquent 
speaker, Pierre-Victurnien Vergniaud. This brilliant lawyer from Limoges, in 
the southwest of France, had quickly established himself as the best speaker in 
the Assembly.176 According to Vergniaud, “la liberté absolue n’appartient 
qu’à l’homme sauvage. [S]a volonté seule et sa conservation sont sa suprême 
loi.”177 In order to demonstrate that this was no longer the case once the polity 
had constituted itself, Vergniaud relied on a complete rupture between past and 
present. “C’est que si l’individu aspire au privilège d’être protégé par la 
société,” Vergniaud argued, “il faut qu’il renonce à cette portion de sa liberté 
dont l’exercice pourrait devenir funeste à ceux qui le protégeront.”178 Thus, 
before the Constitution, these natural rights that the Feuillants claimed for the 
émigrés may have applied, but now that the Constitution had been adopted, all 
rights were political rights and granted by the community, not nature. By 
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fleeing the country and arming themselves against it, Vergniaud concluded, the 
émigrés made the interest of all secondary to their own interest and violated the 
highest law, namely that the welfare of the people was the aim of society. “Par 
sa trahison,” Vergniaud said, “il [l’émigré] a rompu le pacte social” and 
aimed at nothing short of “la dissolution du corps social.”179 This treason, as 
Vergniaud called it, actually placed the émigrés outside the social contract. It 
made them “ennemis de la constitution,” and therefore made their crimes 
punishable with death. 
Contrary to his Feuillant opponents, Vergniaud’s reasoning rested not on a 
reference to the past, but a rupture between past and present. By distinguishing 
between right in the state of nature and civil society, Vergniaud did away with 
the constitutional objections of his opponents and established a legal ground on 
which to charge émigrés with treason and, as a result, execute them. This 
dissociation, as it is called in rhetorical terms,180 allowed Vergniaud to escape 
the tension of having to recognize the émigrés constitutional right to plot 
against the Constitution by splitting the source of this tension in two. In 
Vergniaud’s view, there were two sets or rights: 1) natural rights, which man 
enjoyed solely in the state of nature on account of being born, and 2) social 
rights, which were enjoyed solely as member of the political community that 
guaranteed them.181 Only the latter rights were protected by the Constitution, 
Vergniaud argued, and only if the citizen did not violate the highest 
constitutional duty to refrain from anything that flew in the face of the 
wellbeing of the community.182 On the basis of his dissociation, Vergniaud 
discarded the Feuillant vision for the Assembly as redundant. The Assembly, 
in the Feuillant’s view, was simply an administrative organ that had to 
implement the eternal laws of nature prescribed in the Constitution. Vergniaud 
cast aside this limited view of the Assembly’s legislative duty as grounded on 
the false assumption that France was still residing in the state of nature. Instead 
of passive guardians of natural rights, the delegates were active enforcers of 
the social contract. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the French debate on the émigrés case 
demonstrates a different attitude towards the past on that side of the Atlantic. 
Whereas the Feuillants proceeded from a narrative structure of arguments, in 
which the past played a crucial role, the Girondins made no attempt to justify 
their position in history, but in fact relied on a complete rupture between past 
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and present, thereby rendering history irrelevant to their interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
In retrospect, there are two important points the case studies demonstrate 
with regard to the relationship between the past and claims of constitutionality. 
First, both cases demonstrate that the past forms an important invisible source 
for establishing the “true” meaning of the French and American Constitutions. 
In both debates, speakers invoke history to give credibility to their 
interpretation of the Constitution. It is important to note that the past, in this 
sense, functions as a means to an end. It is used to confer further persuasive 
power to an already fixed interpretation of the constitution. This means that 
references to the past are not made out of a historical curiosity to establish, on 
the basis of historical records, what the “true” meaning of the Constitution 
was. On the contrary, just like modern-day Justices of the Supreme Court, the 
speakers were only interested in the past as a means to build a narrative 
argumentation to support their reading of the Constitution. 
As the debates illustrate, the narratives function as short stories about the 
origins of American and French government. Yet, however harmless that may 
sound, scholars have long recognized that narratives are powerful mechanisms 
to shape and structure the audience’s identity.183 Narratives not only tell us that 
who we are in the present is who we were in the past, but also who we should 
be in the future. In these narratives, the past functions as a mirror, since it is 
implied that the identity of the present generation can be found by looking 
back to history. This link between past, present, and future gives narratives 
their powerful, suggestive force, and it entices the audience—once it accepts 
the past—to adhere to the identity created by the speaker and to act 
accordingly. 
As the debate on the Alien Act demonstrates, the use of the past can be 
highly selective. Republicans and Federalists both emphasize different periods 
in history to support their reading of the Constitution. For the Republicans, the 
struggle against British tyranny in 1776 is important because it allows them to 
paint the Alien Act as a despotic measure. For the Federalists, on the other 
hand, the constitutional crisis of 1787 is crucial, in order to portray the Alien 
Act as a measure to maintain order. This selective use of specific pieces of 
history, however, raises a question with regard to the value of the past in 
general. After all, if the past can be bent and shaped to support any 
interpretation of a clause in the Constitution, is history rendered more or less 
irrelevant for determining the constitutionality of policy measures? The answer 
to this question, however dissatisfying, must be that as long as the past 
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functions as an invisible source of constitutionality and shapes political 
identity, the best remedy against a highly selective view of the history—what 
legal scholar Jill Lepore calls historical fundamentalism184—is a thorough 
understanding of the past itself. 
The second point that can be made on the basis of the two case studies is 
that the past as an invisible source of constitutionality is not a phenomenon 
unique to either country. As it turns out, history plays a role in constitutional 
interpretation on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the study of the two 
debates does show that the past plays a more significant role in the United 
States. In America, the use of the past to determine what it means to be 
American is undisputed. Both factions in the debate rely on the past to shape 
their audience’s identity. Only the outcome, and not the use of the past itself, is 
disputed. Speakers come to different conclusions using the same narrative 
argumentation. The situation is entirely different across the Atlantic. In the 
French émigrés debate the use of the past itself is highly disputed. Only one 
faction, the Feuillants, cite history to support their reading of the Constitution, 
whereas their opponents, the Girondin faction, neglect history all together. In 
fact, these delegates rely on a complete rupture between past and present to 
support their reading of the Constitution. Who we are, in this view, is no longer 
who we were, but simply who we want to be. 
This raises the question of how to explain the difference in the weight 
attributed to the past as an invisible source of constitutionality on both sides of 
the Atlantic. This Article cannot begin to treat such a question in an exhaustive 
way. It is certainly clear that American revolutionaries had a very different 
attitude towards history than their French counterparts. It was, after all, much 
easier for the Americans to respect and even admire the British Constitution, 
under which their colonies had thrived, than for the French to anything but 
loathe the Absolute Monarchy that their Revolution sought to replace. This 
raises the further question whether we can speak of two distinct “temporal 
cultures” on either side of the Atlantic. Of course, the two case studies in this 
Article can only begin to answer such a complex question, but the results 
certainly invite further inquiry. The prevailing view that rises from the debates 
studied here is that the past is not something dead and done, but alive and 
kicking. What the French and American revolutionaries make clear is that the 
real questions in political debate are whether history shall be our guide, and 
whose history that will be. 
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